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Ordinally single-peaked preferences are distinguished from cardinally single-
peaked preferences, in which all players have a similar perception of distances in some 
one-dimensional ordering.  While ordinal single-peakedness can lead to disconnected 
coalitions that have a “hole” in the ordering, cardinal single-peakedness precludes this 
possibility, based on two models of coalition formation: 
• Fallback (FB):  Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in          
  their preference rankings until a majority coalition forms. 
• Build-Up (BU):  Similar to FB, except that when nonmajority subcoalitions form,  
  they fuse into composite players, whose positions are defined cardinally and who  
  are treated as single players in the convergence process. 
FB better reflects the unconstrained, or nonmyopic, possibilities of coalition formation, 
whereas BU—because all subcoalition members must be included in any majority 
coalition that forms—restricts combinatorial possibilities and tends to produce less 
compact majority coalitions. 
The “strange bedfellows” frequently observed in legislative coalitions and military 
alliances suggest that even when players agree on, say, a left-right ordering, their 
perceptions of exactly where players stand in this ordering may differ substantially.  If so, 
a player may be acceptable to a coalition but may not find every member in it acceptable, 
causing that player not to join and possibly creating a disconnected coalition.  
JEL Classification:  C78, D71 
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Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
1 
1.  Introduction 
That individual coherence, like transitive individual preferences, can lead to social 
incoherence—like voting cycles or the nonexistence of the core (Austen–Smith and 
Banks, 2000)—is well-known in the social-choice literature.  In this paper, we show that 
a similar phenomenon can occur in coalition formation, whereby players with 
“connected” preferences may jell into “disconnected” coalitions.   
This phenomenon is not surprising when strategic considerations come into play.  
For example, two ideologically distant players might join together if that would enable 
them to win, whereas either player’s joining with a smaller more centrally located player 
would not afford this possibility.  More surprising, such strange bedfellows may get 
together for non-strategic reasons, which we will show can occur under two models of 
coalition formation.  
Both models assume that players have ideal positions along a one-dimensional 
policy space, or line.  The ordering of these ideal positions—say, from left to right—is 
assumed to be known by all players.   The goal of the players is to form simple-majority 
coalitions containing ideologically proximate players.  
There is nothing sacrosanct about the coalition’s having a simple majority of 
members; it could be any qualified majority, up to and including unanimity.  Although 
players could be unequally weighted, we assume in our models that they are not to avoid 
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strategic questions, such as a player’s wanting to join one player (but not another) 
because the former (but not the latter) would make the coalition winning.      
In both coalition-formation models, each player either ranks or rates every other 
player in terms of that player’s desirability as a coalition partner (alternatively, players 
could rank or rate policy alternatives according to their desirability).  They progressively 
descend in their preference rankings, or move toward the ideal positions of other players 
in their ratings, until there is a simple majority of members that considers every other 
member of that majority acceptable as a coalition partner (or every policy alternative in a 
set acceptable).
2 
We call coalition formation constrained if less-than-majority coalitions, or 
subcoalitions, which do not yet constitute a majority, fuse into composite players whose 
composite position restricts the positions of their component members (in a way to be 
made precise later).  Treating these composite players as single players—whose 
component members can no longer be separated—in a smaller game, we repeat the 
movement of players toward each other until new subcoalitions form.  This process 
continues until a majority coalition forms.   
If composite players do not form, and only the preferences of individual players 
matter, we call coalition formation unconstrained.  Whether constrained or 
unconstrained, the descent in player preferences, or movement toward the ideal positions 
of other players, proceeds in the manner of “fallback bargaining” (Brams and Kilgour, 
2001), which we will describe and illustrate in section 4.   
Players’ preferences are ordinally single-peaked if   
• all players can be ordered along a line such that each player’s preferences for  
  coalition partners declines to the left and right of its ideal position;  
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• this ordering is the same for all players.  
More stringently, preferences are  cardinally single-peaked  if  
• there exists a single spatial representation of player positions on the line such that  
  each player’s less preferred coalition partners are farther away from it. 
The existence of a single representation ensures that the players have similar perceptions 
of the distances between players’ positions, as we will show later. 
Disconnected coalitions may be the first majority coalitions to form under either 
unconstrained or constrained coalition formation if preferences are ordinally single-
peaked but not if they are cardinally single-peaked.  To illustrate a disconnected 
coalition, assume that five players can be ordered 1-2-3-4-5 along a line from left to right.  
Then the first majority coalition to form might be {1, 2, 4}—without player 3—creating a 
“hole” in an otherwise connected coalition.     
This seems paradoxical, because if any individual player considers both players 2 
and 4 desirable as coalition partners, ordinal single-peakedness implies that it must also 
consider player 3 desirable.  Indeed, if preferences are ordinally single-peaked, the 
preferred coalition partners of each player comprise a cluster, without holes, around that 
player.  Yet, as our models show, connected individual preferences of players can result 
in a disconnected majority coalition.
3     
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, we distinguish between ordinally 
single-peaked and cardinally single-peaked preferences, showing in what sense the latter 
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are consistent but the former are not.   In section 3, we show that there may be no stable 
majority coalitions, whether preferences are ordinally single-peaked or cardinally single-
peaked.   
In the absence of such a stable outcome, we focus on processes of coalition 
formation, analyzing first what we call fallback, or unconstrained, coalition formation in 
section 4.  We demonstrate that disconnected coalitions can occur with as few as five 
players, but a unique disconnected coalition requires at least seven players.  We then 
analyze other properties of fallback coalitions, especially those related to its size and the 
“spread” of its members.  
The build-up, or constrained, model, which requires a measure of numerical 
distance rather than ordinal ranks, is introduced and analyzed in section 5.  While it tends 
to produce larger majority coalitions than the fallback model, it can lead to a unique 
disconnected coalition with as few as five players. 
We present our conclusions in section 6, emphasizing the importance of analyzing 
the dynamics of coalition formation rather than just looking for stability.  In addition, we 
comment on the applicability of the models to coalition formation in legislatures and 
military alliances.    
2.  Ordinally Single-Peaked and Cardinally Single-Peaked Preferences 
Preferences are said to be ordinally single-peaked if there exists an ordering of 
players, along a single dimension, such that each player’s more-preferred coalition 
partners are closer to it than its less-preferred coalition partners.  Put another way, each 
                                                                                                                                                 
We will show that this need not be the case.  The literature on spatial models of voting is vast, but good 
overviews can be found in Hinich and Munger (1997) and Shepsle and Bonchek (1997).    7 
player’s preference for coalition partners declines the farther they are from the player’s 
ideal (peak) position on this dimension.   
That preferences are not always ordinally single-peaked is illustrated by a three-
person example, based on the Condorcet voting paradox, wherein players rank each other 
as coalition partners as follows: 
Example A:          1:   2  3          2:  3 1          3:  1 2.  
Thus, player 1’s first choice of a coalition partner is player 2, and its second choice is 
player 3.  While we assume that player i ranks itself highest—that is, it most desires that 
it be included in any majority coalition that forms—we indicate only its ranking of other 
players in its preference ordering.
4 
It is straightforward to check that none of the 3! = 6 orderings of the players along 
a single dimension, such as 1-2-3 that might be represented as,   
1                                        2                    3, 
can be consistent with the preferences in Example A.  The ordering illustrated is 
consistent with the rankings of players 1 and 2 in Example A, but not with that of player 
3, because player 3 prefers player 1 to player 2. 
Ordinal single-peakedness requires only that each player’s preference be 
describable by the same left-right ordering of players.  There is no requirement that the 
players have a similar perception of all players’ positions, and therefore of the distances 
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between them (e.g., that player 2 is closer to player 3 than player 1, as shown in the above 
representation).   Indeed, this may be impossible with ordinally single-peaked 
preferences, as illustrated by our next example (with ordering 1-2-3-4): 
Example B:          1:   2  3  4          2:   3  4  1          3:   2  1  4          4:   3  2  1. 
Because player 2 ranks player 1 last as a coalition partner, player 2 (in boldface 
below) must perceive that the distance between it and player 1 is greater than the distance 
between it and player 3, and even between it and player 4: 
Player 2’s perception:     1              2     3          4. 
By comparison, because player 3 ranks player 4 last as a coalition partner, player 3 must 
perceive that the distance between it and player 4 is greater than the distance between it 
and players 1 and 2: 
Player 3’s perception:     1          2     3        4. 
We say that players’ preferences are cardinally single-peaked if it is possible to 
capture them in a single spatial representation of player positions along the real number 
line.  If player i’s position is xi, and player j’s is xj, denote the distance between them by 
dij = |xi - xj|.  (Note that dii = 0.)  Then player i’s preference ordering for coalition partners 
is given by ranking all players, j, in increasing order of dij.  
To demonstrate formally that Example B is ordinally but not cardinally single-
peaked, note that player 2’s ranking implies d34 < d24 < d12, whereas player 3’s ranking 
implies d12 < d13 < d34.  This contradiction shows that Example B, while ordinally single-
peaked with respect to the ordering 1-2-3-4, is not cardinally single-peaked:  Different 9 
players order the distances between positions differently, so there is no single spatial 
representation valid for all players.   
We adopt the convention that players with single-peaked preferences are named 1, 
2, 3, . . ., n from left to right.  At the extremes, player 1’s preference ordering must be 1:  
2 3 4 . . . n, and player n’s must be n:  n-1 n-2 . . . 1.  For convenience, we assume that 
players are never equally preferred—that is, no two players are ever equidistant from any 
given player.  
It is easy to see that if preferences are ordinally single-peaked, and if m is any 
integer satisfying 1 = m = n, then player i’s m most-preferred coalition partners, including 
i itself, is the subset {g(i), g(i) + 1, . . ., h(i)}, where and g(i) = i = h(i) and h(i) = g(i) + m 
- 1.
5  That is, player i’s most-preferred set of coalition partners forms a cluster, without 
“holes,” around player i.  For instance, if m = 3 in Example B, each player’s three most-
preferred coalition partners are as follows: 
 1:   {1, 2, 3}          2:   {2, 3, 4}          3:   {1, 2, 3}          4:   {2, 3, 4}. 
It can be checked that when preferences are not ordinally single-peaked, any linear 
ordering of the players (i.e., along a line) must result in some player’s set of m most-
preferred coalition partners, for some m, having a hole.  In Example A, for instance, when 
the linear ordering is 1-2-3, player 3’s two most-preferred coalition partners are {1, 3}, 
leaving a hole because of the absence of player 2.  
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If preferences are cardinally single-peaked and player i is to the left of player j, 
then the set containing player i’s m most-preferred coalition partners must either be 
identical to player j’s or start to the left of j’s.  More precisely,   
Proposition 1.  If preferences are cardinally single-peaked, the clusters around 
each player satisfy the following monotonicity property:  For any m, i < j implies that 
g(i) = g(j).
6    
Proof.  To prove this statement, fix m and suppose that j > i.  If j = h(i), the 
statement holds because g(j) = j - m + 1 = h(i) - m + 1 = g(i).  Otherwise, i < j < h(i).  
Suppose that k < g(i).  Because k < i < j, dkj > dki.  Also, because h(i) is among i’s m 
most-preferred coalition partners, and k is not, it must be the case the dki  > di,h(i) > dj,h(i).  
Therefore, dkj  > dj,h(i).  Now assume (to obtain a contradiction) that k is among j’s m 
most-preferred coalition partners.  Then so is h(i), because dkj  > dki  > dj,h(i).  But this is 
impossible, because j’s m most-preferred coalition partners form an interval, Im(j) = {g(j), 
g(j) + 1,  . . . , h(j)}, where h(j) - g(j) = m - 1.  But h(i) - k > h(i) - g(i) = m - 1, 
demonstrating that both h(i) and k cannot both belong to an interval containing m players.  
This contradiction shows that if k < g(i), then k < g(j), completing the proof that g(i) = 
g(j).  Q.E.D.  
To illustrate Proposition 1, consider the following example, in which player 
preferences are cardinally single-peaked: 
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Example C:          1:   2  3  4          2:   1  3  4          3:   4  2  1          4:   3  2  1. 
If m = 3, each player’s most-preferred sets of coalition partners are as follows: 
 1:   {1, 2, 3}          2:   {1, 2, 3}          3:   {2, 3, 4}          4:   {2, 3, 4}. 
Notice that (i) player 1 and 2’s, and player 3 and 4’s, most-preferred sets of coalition 
partners are identical and (ii) player 2’s most-preferred set starts with player 1, one 
position to the left of the starting player, 2, in player 3’s most-preferred set.  If players’ 
preferences are cardinally single-peaked, their perceptions of distance can be described 
by a single spatial representation, as illustrated by Example C, 
All players’ perceptions:  1     2                                    3                  4, 
and their orderings are consistent.  
By contrast, the most-preferred sets for m = 3 in Example B, in which preferences 
are ordinally but not cardinally single-peaked, do not satisfy this property:  Player 2’s 
most-preferred set starts with player 2, one position to the right of the starting player, 1, 
in player 3’s most-preferred set.  
Our results so far can be summarized as follows: 
1.  If preferences are not single-peaked, as in Example A, they cannot be described 
by a single linear ordering, which means that there are “holes,” with respect to any linear 
ordering of the players, in some player’s set of most-preferred coalition partners.   
2.  If players’ preferences are ordinally single-peaked, as in Example B, there is 
such a linear ordering, and each player’s most-preferred coalition partners form a cluster 
around its preferred position.   12 
3.  If preferences are cardinally single-peaked, as in Example C, player positions 
are describable by a single spatial model, rendering players’ perceptions of distance 
similar and their consequent orderings consistent.  Such consistency implies the 
following monotonicity property:  If player i’s position is to the left of player j’s, then i’s 
cluster of most-preferred coalition partners may not lie to the right of j ’s cluster.  
It is worth noting that the “unfolding” technique of Coombs (1964) for determining 
whether stimuli and other kinds of psychological data can be represented by either 
unidimensional or multidimensional scales is closely related to ordinal and cardinal 
single-peakedness.  In the unidimensional case, individual preferences (I scales) are 
ordinally single-peaked if they can be “unfolded” into a qualitative J (“joint”) scale, and 
cardinally single-peaked if they can be unfolded into a quantitative J scale.  Whereas 
Coombs’ interest was in constructing J scales—qualitative or quantitative—from a set of 
I scales, ours is in determining whether a qualitative J scale (preferences are ordinally 
single-peaked) is also a quantitative J scale (preferences are cardinally single-peaked).   
Among other things, Coombs showed that as the number of players increases, the 
proportion of ordinally single-peaked preferences that are cardinally single-peaked tends 
to zero, making disconnected coalitions more likely in our models.  Before analyzing 
disconnected coalitions, however, we next show that neither ordinally nor cardinally 
single-peaked preferences ensure stable coalitions.   
3.  Stable Majority Coalitions:  They May Not Exist 
Define a majority coalition to be stable if no member desires to switch to another 
majority coalition, resulting in a so-called Tiebout equilibrium (Tiebout, 1956; Greenberg 
and Weber, 1985, 1986, 1993; Demange, 1994).  While the cyclical majorities resulting 13 
from the Condorcet paradox in Example A obviously preclude such an equilibrium, more 
surprising is that the ordinal single-peakedness of Example B, and even the cardinal 
single-peakedness of Example C, confer no such stability on majority coalitions.   
In analyzing stability, we do not define a game and analyze its equilibria.  Instead, 
we postulate in sections 4 and 5 coalition-formation processes that seem likely to support, 
if not stabilize, the coalitions that form under them.  In doing so, we focus on the 
preferences of players for each other, and on the majority coalitions they lead to, and ask 
if any players would prefer to be in different majority coalitions.   
Proposition 2.  There may be no stable majority coalition even if preferences are  
cardinally or ordinally single-peaked. 
Proof.  We begin by showing the instability of majority coalitions for cardinally 
single-peaked preferences.  Consider Example C, wherein player preferences are 
cardinally single-peaked with respect to ordering 1-2-3-4.
7  Now consider majority 
coalition 123.  Player 3 would prefer to be in coalition 234, because it ranks player 4 
higher than player 1 (both coalitions share players 2 and 3); hence, coalition 123 is 
unstable.  Likewise, majority coalition 234 is unstable, because player 3 has the opposite 
preference—it prefers player 1 to player 4 and would, therefore, prefer to be in coalition 
123.  Finally, in the case of the two disconnected majority coalitions, 124 and 134, it is 
easy to show that all three players would each prefer to be in one or the other of the 
connected coalitions, 123 and 234.   
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Majority coalitions in Example B can be shown to be unstable by a similar 
argument.  This proves that preferences that are ordinally but not cardinally single-
peaked may also not yield stable majority coalitions.  Q.E.D.      
To be sure, the presence of one or more dissatisfied players in every majority 
coalition is not the only criterion of instability.
8  Stronger conditions that do ensure 
stability have been proposed in, among other places, Greenberg and Weber (1985, 1986, 
1993), Demange and Henriet (1991), Demange (1994), Bogomolnaia and Jackson (1998), 
Jackson and Moselle (1998), and Burani and Zwicker (2001).  In a review article, 
Greenberg (1994) gives several reasons why, as Greenberg and Weber (1993, p. 63) put 
it, “there is only a relatively small number of results that guarantee the existence of a 
‘stable’ coalition structure.”   
We could follow the example of such equilibrium models and impose conditions 
that would render the coalitions that emerge from our models stable.  However, this 
would detract from our main purpose of providing insight into dynamic processes of 
coalition formation that may, themselves, contribute to stability.  
The approach we take next is algorithmic, rather than axiomatic, in the sense that it 
postulates rules for players’ sequentially forming coalitions without insisting that the 
resulting coalitions be stable.  Indeed, we have shown that one kind of stability may be 
impossible to achieve.  This “generative” approach to deriving macroscopic behavior 
from microscopic assumptions is espoused in, among other places, Epstein (1999).      
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4.  Fallback (Unconstrained) Coalition Formation   
We now define and illustrate fallback coalition formation (FB), in which 
subcoalitions that form prior to the emergence of a majority coalition do not constrain the 
formation of such a coalition.  FB proceeds as follows: 
1.  The most desirable coalition partner of each player is considered.  If two players 
mutually desire each other, and this is a majority of players, then this is the majority 
coalition that forms.  The process stops, and we call this a level 1 majority coalition. 
2.  If there is no level 1 majority coalition, then the next-most desirable coalition 
partners of all players are also considered.  If there is a majority of players that mutually 
desire each other at this level, then this is the majority coalition (or coalitions) that forms.  
The process stops, and we call this a level 2 majority coalition.  
3.  The players descend to lower and lower levels in their rankings until a majority 
coalition, all of whose members mutually desire each other, forms for the first time.  The 
process stops, with the resulting largest majority coalition(s) at this level designated an 
FB coalition(s).      
We illustrate FB with the preceding examples:   
Example A:          1:   2  3          2:  3  1          3:  1 2. 
There is no level 1 majority coalition, because no pair of members consider each 
other mutually desirable at this level.  At level 2, however, the grand coalition (of all 
                                                                                                                                                 
either of our models, theirs always leads to stable connected (“segregating”) coalitions and hence does not 
account for strange bedfellows.  16 
players), 123, forms, because members of all pairs, 12, 13, and 23, become mutually 
desirable at this level.  Thus, the FB coalition is the grand coalition.  
Example B:          1:   2  3  4          2:   3  4  1          3:   2  1  4          4:   3  2  1. 
At level 1, coalition 23 forms; at level 2, coalitions 13 and 24 form; at level 3, 
coalitions 12, 14, and 34 form, as well as all 3-person coalitions and the grand coalition, 
1234.  Thus, the FB coalition can be the grand coalition, even when majority preferences 
do not cycle (as they do in Example A).   
Likewise in Example C, it is not difficult to show that the FB coalition is the grand 
coalition.  Thus, if preferences are either ordinally single-peaked (Example B) or 
cardinally single-peaked (Example C), the FB coalition may be the grand coalition.       
We next present a five-person example in which preferences are ordinally single-
peaked and there are two FB coalitions, one of which includes nonadjacent players, 
proving the following proposition: 
Proposition 3.  If preferences are ordinally single-peaked, an FB coalition may be 
disconnected. 
Proof.  Assume five players have the following preferences: 
 
Example D (FB Coalition Disconnected but Not Unique) 
1:   2  3  4  5     2:  1  3  4  5     3:   4  5  2  1     4:  3  2  1  5     5:   4  3  2  1 
One can verify that these preferences are ordinally single-peaked, with respect to 
ordering 1-2-3-4-5, by checking that each player’s m most acceptable coalition partners, 
for every m, cluster around it without holes.  However, these preferences are not 17 
cardinally single-peaked, because player 3’s ranking implies d45 < d35 < d23, and player 
4’s ranking implies d23 < d24 < d45, which are inconsistent.   
The largest coalitions that form at each level, until two FB coalitions form at level 
3, are as follows (the starred coalitions are “ordinally m-compact,” which will be defined 
after the Proposition 5): 
Level 1:  12*, 34*               Level 2:  35               Level 3:  124, 234 
Notice that we do not include coalitions 14, 23, and 24 at level 3 in our listing of 
coalitions because they are proper subsets of coalitions 124 or 234 at level 3.  Clearly, FB 
coalition 124 is disconnected, with a hole due to the absence of player 3.  Q.E.D. 
The underlying reason that player 3 is excluded from coalition 124 is that whereas 
players 1 and 2 necessarily rank player 3 higher than player 4 (because of ordinal single-
peakedness), player 3 ranks players 2 and 1 at the bottom of its preference order.  In 
particular, player 3 does not consider player 1 acceptable at level 3.  
That pairs of player may rank each other quite differently, even when their 
preferences are single-peaked, differs sharply from Axelrod’s (1997, chs. 4-5) “landscape 
theory” of aggregation, in which the propensities of pairs of players to coalesce are 
assumed to be the same.  Also, landscape theory predicts coalitions, not the dynamic 
process that leads to them. 
We next show that, if the number of players is increased from five to at least 
seven, a disconnected coalition may be the only FB coalition: 
Proposition 4.  If preferences are ordinally single-peaked, the FB coalition can be 
unique and disconnected.  At least seven  players are required for this to happen. 18 
Proof.  Assume seven players have the following preferences: 
Example E (FB Coalition Unique and Disconnected) 
  1:   2  3  4  5  6  7               2:   1  3  4  5  6  7               3:   2  1  4  5  6  7        
4:   5  6  3  7  2  1    5:   4  3  2  1  6  7       6:   5  4  3  2  1  7          7:   6  5  4  3  2  1 
 
One can verify that these preferences are ordinally single-peaked, with respect to 
ordering 1-2-3-4-5-6-7, by examining clusters.  However, these preferences are not 
cardinally single-peaked, because player 4’s ranking implies d56 < d46 < d34, whereas 
player 5’s ranking implies d34 < d35 < d56, which are inconsistent.   
The largest coalitions that form at each level until a single (disconnected) FB 
coalition, 1235, forms at level 4 are as follows: 
Level 1:  12*, 45*      Level 2:  46, 123*      Level 3:  34      Level 4:  47, 1235*  
To show that a unique disconnected FB coalition requires at least 7 players, note that any 
coalition of size k that forms at level k - 1 must be connected.  Consequently, if n = 6, a 
disconnected coalition of 4 players must form by level 4; in fact, at level 5 the grand 
coalition forms.   
Because all players must rank either player 1 or player 6 last at level 4, the 
connected coalition 2345 must form at this level.  Thus, even if a disconnected coalition 
also forms at level 4, it will not be unique.  Analogously, a unique disconnected coalition 
of 3 players cannot form if n = 5; if n = 4, it is easy to check that no disconnected 
coalition can form.  Q.E.D. 19 
Observe that the formation of disconnected coalitions does not depend on players’ 
having preferences over subsets.  In Example E, for instance, the formation of 
disconnected coalition 1235 is unrelated to whether player 1 prefers 125 or 134 (either 
preference is possible). 
We next describe some properties of FB coalitions. 
Proposition 5.  FB coalitions may not be minimal majority coalitions, whether 
preferences are ordinally single-peaked, cardinally single-peaked, or neither. 
Proof.  The FB coalitions in Example B (ordinally single-peaked preferences), 
Example C (cardinally single-peaked preferences), and Example A (neither) are all the 
grand coalitions, not minimal majority coalitions of three players (Examples B and C) or 
two players (Example A).  Q.E.D. 
We next investigate properties of FB coalitions relating to their “spread.”  The 
ordinal dispersion (Odisp) of a coalition of size m is the sum, over all members of the 
coalition, of the minimum number of pairwise switches (in adjacent preferences) that are 
required to put the coalition members in position 1, 2, …, m of the player’s ranking. 
Example A:  Odisp (13) = 1 + 0 = 1 (player 1 must switch 2 and 3 to induce ranking 1 3;  
                       player 3 need make no switches to induce ranking 3 1). 
Example B:  Odisp (124) = 1 + 1 + 2 = 4 (for players 1, 2, and 4, respectively).   
Call a coalition of size m that minimizes Odisp the ordinally m-compact coalition.  
These coalitions are starred in Examples D and E.  We next show that FB coalitions may 
or may not be ordinally m-compact if preferences are ordinally single-peaked.  20 
Proposition 6.  If preferences are ordinally single-peaked, no FB coalition may be 
ordinally m-compact. 
Proof.   In Example D, FB disconnected coalition 124 requires four pairwise 
switches, FB connected coalition 234 requires three, but non-FB 3-coalition 345 requires 
only two pairwise switches and is ordinally 3-compact.  Q.E.D. 
 
The fact that disconnected FB 3-coalition 124 in Example D is not ordinally 3-
compact does not imply that disconnected coalitions cannot be ordinally m-compact:  
Proposition 7.  If preferences are ordinally single-peaked, a disconnected FB 
coalition may be ordinally m-compact. 
Proof.  Observe that disconnected FB 4-coalition 1235 in Example E, which 
requires six pairwise switches, is starred.  Connected 4-coalitions 1234, 2345, 3456, and 
4567 require, respectively, 8, 13, 8, and 10 pairwise switches; disconnected 4-coalitions, 
other than 1235, require even more.  Hence, disconnected 4-coalition 1235 is ordinally 4-
compact.  Q.E.D.    
Define the ordinal diameter (Odiam) of a coalition to be the maximum, over all 
members of the coalition, of the distance in ranks between each player (ranked first in its 
own ordering) and its least-preferred coalition member. 
Example A:  Odiam (13) = max {2, 1} = 2 (player 3 is ranked 3
rd by player 1, giving it a  
                       distance of 3 – 1 = 2 ; player 1 is ranked 2
nd by player 3, giving it a      
                       distance of 2 – 1 = 1).  
Example B:  Odiam (124) = max {3, 3, 3} = 3 (for players 1, 2, and 4, respectively). 21 
Call the coalition of size m that minimizes Odiam the ordinally m-narrow 
coalition. 
Proposition 8.  All FB coalitions are ordinally m-narrow.
9  
Proof.  Because the descent stops at the level at which, for the first time, a majority 
of players considers each other mutually acceptable, any earlier stoppage would not 
produce a majority coalition.  Any majority coalition not an FB coalition must have, for 
some pair of players, greater rank difference.  Q.E.D. 
In Example D, because FB coalition 234 appears for the first time at level 3, we 
know there is at least one player (in this case, player 3) that ranks another player (player 
2) 3
rd  in coalition 234; likewise for FB disconnected coalition 124.  But non-FB coalition 
345, which we showed earlier is ordinally 3-compact, scores worse on the Odiam 
criterion:  Player 4 ranks player 5 last (i.e., its 4
th choice), illustrating that an ordinally m-
compact coalition may not be ordinally m-narrow.  Hence, these concepts tap two 
different aspects of the spread of FB coalitions.    
When an ordinally m-narrow FB coalition is not ordinally m-compact, as in 
Example D,
10 the FB coalition is probably more difficult to disrupt than the ordinally m-
compact coalition.  The reason is that the ordinally m-compact coalition must contain at 
least one player that is ranked lower by some coalition member than the FB coalition.  
This less-desired player would seem a more likely candidate for replacement than any 
member of the FB coalition, rendering the FB coalition more stable.  
                                                 
 
9 Unlike our earlier propositions, this proposition holds for any preferences, not just those that are ordinally 
or cardinally single-peaked. 
10In Example E, by contrast, the ordinally 4-compact coalition, 1235, is also the ordinally 4-narrow FB 
coalition. 22 
The property of ordinal m-narrowness of FB coalitions notwithstanding, FB 
coalitions that are disconnected would still seem fragile, especially if the player left out is 
the Condorcet player (the player preferred by a majority of players in pairwise 
comparisons to every other player).  As a case in point, player 3 in Example D, and 
player 4 in Example D, are Condorcet players, but they are the players left out of the 
disconnected FB coalitions in each example.  This can never be the case if preferences 
are cardinally single-peaked, which also preclude disconnected FB coalitions.  
Proposition 9.  If preferences are cardinally single-peaked, then every FB 
coalition is connected.  Moreover, if the number of players is odd, every majority 
coalition includes the (unique) Condorcet player. 
Proof.  Recall the monotonicity property of Proposition 1:  If preferences are 
cardinally single-peaked, then the cluster of any player i’s m most-preferred coalition 
partners, Im(i) = {g(i), g(i) + 1, …, h(i)}, satisfies g(i) = g(j) whenever i < j.  Recall that 
h(i) = g(i) + m – 1.  
Now suppose that i < j < k, and i and k are members of an FB coalition of size m.  
Then any member e of the coalition must also belong to Im(j), because e = g(k) = g(j), and 
e = h(i) = h(j).  Also, j must belong to Im(e), because j > i = g(e) and j < k = h(e).  It 
follows that j belongs to the coalition, so it is connected.  Because the coalition has more 
than half the members, it must include the median player, which is the unique Condorcet 
player if the number of players is odd.  Q.E.D. 
So far we have shown that if preferences are ordinally single-peaked,  
• FB can produce non-unique disconnected majority coalitions if there are at least  23 
  five players, unique disconnected majority coalitions if there are at least seven  
  players;     
• FB coalitions need be neither minimal majority nor ordinally m-compact  
  coalitions, but they are always ordinally m-narrow.   
If preferences are cardinally single-peaked, 
• FB coalitions will always be connected and include the Condorcet (median)  
  player if there is an odd number of players.  
Thus, if players’ clusters of preferred coalition partners satisfy the monotonicity property 
of Proposition 1—which renders players’ perceptions of distance similar and their 
consequent orderings consistent—disconnected coalitions are ruled out and unique 
Condorcet players are ruled in. 
5.  Build-Up (Constrained) Coalition Formation 
In this section, we drop the assumption that the preferences of players are ordinal.  
Instead, we assume that players can indicate their degrees of preference for coalition 
partners by expressing, in quantitative terms, how much more they prefer, say, a first-
choice coalition partner to a second-choice partner.   
We continue to identify preference with spatial proximity, but now defined 
numerically.  For instance, consider Example C, in which the preferences of the players 
are cardinally single-peaked, so the players have a common perception of the ordering of 
distances between player ideal positions that was illustrated in section 2.  We can turn 24 
this ordinal representation into a numerical one by making the ideal positions of players 
real numbers on [0, 1], as illustrated underneath the line below: 
Example C´     
All players’ perceptions:  1     2                               3            4. 
           0    .2                              .7            1 
Instead of assuming, as under FB, that the players descend from their ideal points 
to lower and lower ranks, we assume the following in our model of build-up coalition 
formation (BU):   
1.  The players increase, at a constant rate, the radii of positions, starting from their 
ideal positions, that they consider acceptable.
11  
2.  When the players’ radii touch, so they find each other mutually acceptable, they 
become a single composite player (or subcoalition).  The position of the composite player 
is the average of the ideal positions of its members.
12    
3.  Each time a composite player forms, the expansion process begins again in the 
new and smaller “game,” comprising both individual and composite players, until a 
majority coalition forms for the first time.  The process stops, with the resulting largest 
majority coalition(s) designated BU coalition(s).     
We illustrate BU with Example C´: 
                                                 
11This is analogous to a knife moving across a cake in the fair-division literature (Brams and Taylor, 1996; 
Robertson and Webb, 1998), except that in our coalition-formation model, two knives move in opposite 
directions from an ideal position.  Also, no player calls “stop” to halt the knife; instead, the process stops, 
automatically, when a majority coalition forms for the first time. 
 25 
The first subcoalition to form is 12, which becomes a composite player at .1: 
All players’ perceptions:    12                                 3             4. 
             .1                                 .7             1 
The next subcoalition to form is 34, which becomes a composite player at .85: 
All players’ perceptions:    12                                       34___. 
             .1                                       .85       
Finally, the grand coalition, 1234, will form at position (.10 + .85)/2 = .475,
13 which 
becomes the BU coalition.     
Coalition formation is constrained in the BU model, because the players in each 
subcoalition that forms, now fused into a single player, cannot be selectively excluded 
from any future majority coalition.  In particular, player 4 would be left out if there were 
not this fusion under BU:  Convergence would be to coalition 123,  separated by a 
distance of .7, before it would be to coalition 234, separated by a distance of .8.  
Thus, it is the grand coalition, 1234, that forms in Example C´ under BU.  Because 
the build-up of coalitions has a history, whose lineage is the sequence of subcoalitions 
that form, the BU model is path dependent.  The dependence in this example suggests 
that larger majority coalitions will tend to form under BU than under FB.  
One might think that the constraints on coalition formation under BU would 
prevent the formation of disconnected coalitions, but this is not the case: 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Note that if the BU model were ordinal, like the FB model, we could not calculate an average position, 
which is one reason we have based BU on numerically ideal positions. 
13Here simple averaging of the positions of individual players, and of the pairs that combine is possible, but 
later we will need to do weighted averaging to determine the coalition position when subcoalitions of 
different sizes combine.  The successive use of weighted averaging to determine the position of any BU 
coalition is equivalent to the simple averaging of the positions of all its individual members.    26 
Proposition 10.  If preferences are ordinally single-peaked, a BU coalition can be 
the unique disconnected FB coalition if there are five, but not fewer, players.  
Proof.  Assume that players 1, 2, 4, and 5 have a common perception of distance 
that differs from that of player 3: 
Example F 
Player 1, 2, 4 and 5’s perceptions:  1     2    3     4                                       5 
                0    .1   .2    .3                                       1 
         Player 3’s perception:  1     2                   3                        4     5. 
                0    .1                  .5                       .9     1 
We obtain after .1 unit has been traversed subcoalition 12 (notice that subcoalitions 34 
and 45 do not form, because one player in each is more than .1 units from the other):  
Player 1, 2, 4, and 5’s perceptions:   12       3    4                                       5 
                 .05      .2   .3                                       1 
                    Player 3’s perception:   12                         3                     4    5. 
                 .05                       .5                    .9    1 
Because for players 1, 2, and 4 the distance separating composite player 12 and player 4 
is .25 units, BU disconnected coalition 124 will form next at position [2(.05) + .3]/3 = 
.133 for players 1, 2, 4, and 5, and position [2(.05) +  .9]/3 = .333 for player 3.   
Such a disconnected coalition cannot form if there are only three or four players, 
because a disconnected coalition would have to include both endpoints.  Consequently, 
the grand coalition would form at the same time as all smaller majority coalitions, so a 
disconnected majority coalition cannot form under the FB cardinal model with only four 
or fewer players.  Q.E.D.  27 
The “problem” for player 3 in Example F is that whereas players 1, 2, and 4 
consider player 3 to be acceptable, player 3 does not deem them acceptable because it is 
too far away, on both the left (.45 units from subcoalition 12) and on the right (.40 units 
from player 4).  To be sure, player 5 is even farther from all players—except as player 3 
perceives the situation—so player 5 will suffer the most when disconnected coalition 124 
forms at position .133.     
While the BU model may tend to produce larger majority coalitions than the FB 
model, Example F demonstrates that BU may, nevertheless, produce minimal-majority 
coalitions, and disconnected ones at that, if preferences are ordinally single-peaked.  
Grofman (1982) and Straffin and Grofman (1984) show, in a dynamic model of 
coalition formation that somewhat resembles our BU model, that coalitions will always 
be connected in one dimension but not necessarily in two or more dimensions (i.e., all 
players in the convex hull defined by the spatial positions of coalition members may not 
be in the coalition, creating “holes” in space rather than along a line).
14  Proposition 10, 
however, demonstrates that coalitions need not be connected, even in one dimension, if 
preferences are ordinally single-peaked.  
For FB, we earlier defined notions of ordinal m-compactness and m-narrowness, 
proving that FB coalitions are always ordinally m-narrow but may not be ordinally m-
compact.  We can define analogous notions for BU, with a coalition’s diameter (on which 
narrowness is based) and its dispersion (on which compactness is based) numerical 
distances rather than differences in ranks.   
                                                 
 
14 For extensions of this model, and applications to coalition-formation data in different European 
parliamentary democracies, see Grofman (1996) and Grofman, Straffin, and Noviello (1996).  Laver and 
Schofield (1992), van Deemen (1997), and de Vries (1999) also analyze parliamentary coalitions. 28 
We forego formal definitions of these notions, because the calculations we make in 
the example that proves Proposition 11 makes them evident. 
Proposition 11.  If preferences are cardinally single-peaked, a BU coalition may 
be neither numerically m-compact nor numerically m-narrow.   
Proof.  Consider the following 5-person example:  
Example G 
All players’ perceptions:  1          2          3         4           5. 
                                          0        .26       .52      .72          1 
The first subcoalition to form under BU is 34, which becomes a composite player at 
position .62: 
All players’ perceptions:  1          2             34                 5. 
                                          0        .26           .62                 1 
The next subcoalition to form is 12, which becomes a composite player at position .13: 
All players’ perceptions:      12                   34                 5. 
                                             .13                 . 62                 1 
Finally, BU coalition 345 will form at position [2(.62) + 1]/3 = .75: 
All players’ perceptions:     12                           345____. 
                                            .13                           .75        
It is not difficult to show that the sum of distances among all three pairs of members of 
BU coalition 345 is not minimal—coalition 234 minimizes this dispersion—so coalition 
345 is not the (numerically) 3-compact coalition.  Likewise, the maximum distance 29 
between the extreme members of BU coalition 345 is not minimal—coalition 234 
minimizes this diameter—so coalition 345 is not the (numerically) 3-narrow coalition.  
Q.E.D. 
The fact that BU coalitions may not be numerically m-narrow, even when 
preferences are cardinally single-peaked, is inconsistent with DeSwann’s (1970, 1973) 
assumption that coalitions minimize “policy distance.”  Axelrod’s (1970) assumption of 
connected coalitions may also be violated—if preferences are ordinally but not cardinally 
single-peaked—under both FB (Propositions 3 and 4) and BU (Proposition 10). 
The assumptions of the DeSwann and Axelrod, though inconsistent with our 
conclusions, have proven quite accurate descriptively, at least in predicting parliamentary 
coalitions.  While our models are intended mainly to explicate processes rather than 
outcomes, they do, nevertheless, pinpoint conditions under which disconnected, non-
compact, or non-narrow coalitions—though perhaps exceptional—are likely to form (see 
section 6 for examples).  
If preferences are cardinally single-peaked, BU coalitions will be connected for 
essentially the same reasons that FB coalitions are (see Proposition 9). 
Proposition 12.  If preferences are cardinally single-peaked, BU coalitions are 
always connected.   
Proof.  The first subcoalition to form under BU comprises the closest pair of 
players, which must be adjacent (otherwise, there would be a closer pair); the first 
subcoalition is therefore connected.  At any stage, the next subcoalition to form must join 
the two closest players at that stage.  Again, these players, which may be either individual 
or composite, must be adjacent.  If all coalitions formed prior to this stage are connected, 30 
then the new subcoalition must also be connected.  Thus, at every stage of build-up, a 
majority coalition that forms under BU is connected.  Q.E.D. 
In the final section, we compare our ordinal FB and numerical BU models when 
preferences are ordinally single-peaked and cardinally single-peaked.  We then offer 
some reflections on their applicability to legislative coalitions and military alliances.   
6.  Conclusions and Extensions 
Instability plagues many situations in which players seek to form majority 
coalitions.  Whether the preferences of players for coalition partners are ordinally or 
cardinally single-peaked, at least one player in every majority coalition may prefer a 
different majority coalition and, therefore, have a reason to defect.   
In the face of such instability, we proposed two coalition-formation models, 
fallback (FB) and build-up (BU), that describe how coalitions might plausibly form.  The 
models share the assumption that players coalesce when they find each other mutually 
acceptable. 
Alternatively, we could have assumed that players rank policy alternatives rather 
than each other.  Thus in Example E, assume that the players rank alternatives a, b, c, . . . 
the same as they rank players 1, 2, 3, . . ., making, for instance, player 1’s ranking a > b > 
c > d > e > f > g.  Then it is easy to show that under FB, alternative c will be the first 
supported by a majority coalition—namely, disconnected coalition 1235 at level 3—
which is the same coalition as when the players rank each other.  Similarly, when the 
players place alternatives a, b, c, d, and e on a [0, 1] scale, as they do each other in 
Example F, the set of alternatives, {a, b, d}, will be the first on which a majority 
coalition—namely, disconnected coalition 124—converges under BU.  Thus, 31 
disconnected coalitions can also form if players rank policy alternatives or place them on 
a continuum. 
Under FB, players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their 
preference rankings until a majority coalition emerges.  Subcoalitions that form early do 
not restrict future choices, suggesting FB as a model of unconstrained coalition 
formation.  Because players can abandon early subcoalition partners in order to be part of 
the first majority coalition to form later, they may be thought of as acting nonmyopically 
(though not in the sense of anticipating other players’ choices in a game but rather in 
terms of not tying themselves down too early).   
Under BU, by comparison, subcoalitions fuse into composite players that cannot be 
broken apart.  The movement of players toward each other begins afresh each time a new 
composite player forms, which may constrain the build-up of coalitions that would 
otherwise form were only individual players the building blocks.  Thus, BU is myopic in 
the sense that the “baggage” of coalition partners that players pick up early, when 
subcoalitions form that may hurt them later, cannot be detached.   
We showed that both FB and BU may not produce minimal-majority coalitions or 
ordinally or numerically m-compact coalitions that minimize dispersion in m-member 
coalitions.  The two models differ, however, on the criterion of m-narrowness:  FB 
coalitions minimize the maximum difference in ranks of players, whereas BU m-
coalitions do not necessarily ensure that the numerical distance between their most 
extreme members is minimal.   
In legislatures, the myopia of BU is probably more common than the nonmyopia of 
FB in the passage of ordinary legislation.  Typically, small groups of members coalesce 32 
to try to put together a larger winning coalition.  Once formed, these groups rarely split 
apart.  However, the combining of these groups can lead to “oversize” majority 
coalitions, as compared with the majority coalitions generated by FB from individual 
players.
15   
On the other hand, when a political party is asked to form a new government in a 
parliamentary democracy, FB may be a better mirror of the manner in which the 
governing coalition emerges.  The party’s leaders weigh simultaneously different 
combinations of other parties to try to find the set of coalition partners that it can best 
work with to advance its legislative program.  Because party leaders must think beyond 
the next piece of legislation they want enacted, their thinking is more likely to be 
farsighted and strategic than that of ordinary legislators struggling to win on the next 
vote.   
Whether it is individual legislation or parliamentary control that is sought, the old 
saw that “politics makes strange bedfellows” often turns out to be descriptively accurate.  
Strange bedfellows are also observed in international politics, wherein countries attempt 
to ensure their national security through “unholy alliances.”   
As a case in point, fascist Germany, to neutralize opposition on its eastern front 
just prior to its invasion of Poland that led to the outbreak of World War II, made a 
nonaggression pact with communist Soviet Union in August 1939 (which it violated less 
than two years later in June 1941).  Then Germany—pledged to make Aryans the 
                                                 
15In either case, the build-up is sequential (rather than all at once), which Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 
(1998) argue contributes to the depth of cooperation among members of a multilateral organization. 33 
controlling race—gained (and kept) two more strange bedfellows when, with Italy and 
Japan, it signed the Tripartite Treaty in Berlin in September 1941.
16   
More contemporary examples of what Bronner (1999) calls “crossing paths” could 
be given.  In Strange Bedfellows, Grayson (1999) describes the bureaucratic battles, 
especially in the United States, that led to the expansion of NATO in 1998 to include 
three former communist states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland).   
Our analysis suggests that even when there is a single left-right dimension, it may 
not be so much that players cross paths as have different perceptions of distance along a 
single path that leads them to form disconnected coalitions. True, there may be a second 
salient dimension.  Nevertheless, we think that at least some of the strangeness or 
unholiness of coalition formation in the world is attributable to perceptual differences on 
a single dimension, which reflects ordinal single-peakedness but not cardinal single-
peakedness.
                                                 
 
16Of course, these allies are not so strange if the relevant dimension is democratic-totalitarian regimes, 
because Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union were all, in varying degrees, totalitarian states.  But 
because race was so central to the ideology of Nazi Germany, it seems particularly odd that the German-
Japanese alliance endured until the end.      34 
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